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I. INTRODUCTION

At the current moment, it seems that the anticipated new progressive
Libya, a state that would unite its citizens and move forward towards an
inclusive democratic country might be too much of an ambition. The
Arab Spring, which arose across the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region, began in Tunisia and followed in Egypt, it was the
perfect opportunity for the Libyans to end a forty-year dictatorship rule.
And so they did precisely that. However, with the collapse of the Gadhafi
regime, the country entered into a state of chaos, with fragmentation
defining the country at its best. What remains? An economic catastrophe
in one of its aspects, where the Libyan oil, consistently the main source
of income and welfare of the Libyan people, is at risk. As such, the
foreign operating corporations question what is there to guarantee that
their immense losses caused by the ongoing internal conflict are to be
restituted and compensated?
This Article touches on a crucial element of the very survival of
foreign investments in today's Libya, precisely oil concessions, which is
the full protection and security of these "investments." With that being
said, there have been other situations where the investors in investor-state
relationships have engaged in activities within hostile environments.
Nonetheless, the current situation in Libya poses somewhat different
challenges.
Post-Gadhafi Libya has become fragmented and is ruled by multiple
militias, despite the fact that it has been touted as a two-government state,
as shall be explained later on. Widespread and intensified violence has
also been the theme in this post-conflict period, in fact, the conflict is
ongoing. Oil terminals have been directly targeted with violent acts for
various reasons, and current de facto sterile state institutions cannot
control the situation.
This Article attempts to identify how the notion of full protection and
security can support foreign investors' claims in situations like this.
Although there are different functioning governments and militias, there
are nevertheless doctrines that would protect this notion in the form of
the law of the occupant as well as well-defined Bilateral Investment
Agreements (BITs) that tease the question of which government bears
responsibility. Part II explains the current situation in Libya after the
collapse of the Gadhafi regime. Following that, Part III displays how the
notion of full protection and security has functioned within the previous
legal doctrines and jurisprudence. Lastly, Part IV applies the different
legal doctrines to the post-Gadhafi period, discussing the Articles on the
Responsibility of the State for Internationally Wrongful Acts, and the
exceptions that may be pleaded, includingforce majeure and necessity in
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relation to the laws onjus in bello. Finally, where political risk insurance
could also play a role in safeguarding these investments.
II. A CURRENT STATE OF CHAOS IN LIBYA

&

Ongoing internal tensions, or rather conflict in Libya following the
2011 revolution seem to be at their peak, specifically those connected to
oil concessions granted to different Libyan oil companies. The subject
matter of these concessions is the exploration and exploitation of
hydrocarbons predominately, a major export from Libya. In addition to
national corporations, the Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) lists:
the Eni North African Company, Amerada Hess Company, India oil
Company, Total E&P Company, Petro Canada Company, Polish Oil
Gas Company, OMV Company, OXY Company, BP Exploration Libya
Limited Company, STATOIL Company, Gazprom Company, Repsol
Murzuq Company, Petrobras Company, Chevron Libya LTD Company,
Shell Company, RWE Company, Sonatrach Company, Turkish
Petroleum Corporation, Medco Energy Company, Exxon Mobil
Company, ONGC Limited Company, Tatneft Company, and Wintershall
AG Company as foreign companies operating in Libya.I

1.

Our Companies, NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION, http://noc.ly/index.php/en/companies-

2 (last visited Mar. 26, 2015).
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These companies operate throughout Libya where oil terminals or
fields are located. This includes the largest oil ports in the country, mainly
in the eastern part, consisting of: the Es Sider (Sidra), Ras Lanuf
Zueitina, and Marsa al-Hariga,where 80% of Libya's oil reserves are
located. And in the Western area, there are the El Sharara and El Feel
(Elephant) fields.2 Libya has the largest crude oil reserves in Africa, and
is amongst the top ten oil reserves in the world.3

LnaotI anI natural gas Infrastructure
-

-

Oil pipeline
Ntrlgas pipeline
Ondnaturalgas f~id
lOrefiney

ALNG terminal
Pon~t

* Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, HIS Edin
Appearing with the overthrow of the Gadhafi regime the country's
biggest challenge is its escalated fragmentation. In essence, there are two
competing governments ruling Libya. One, the General National Council
(GNC) or house of representatives, is based in the eastern Libya city
Tobruk and is led by current Prime Minister Abdullah Al-Thanni who
fled the capital Tripoli; to a certain extent this government is
internationally recognized.4 The other is a "de facto" government
2. Country Analysis Brief Libya, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=LY (last visited Mar. 26, 2015).

3.

ADMINISTRATION,

Id.

4. Giorgio Cafiero & Daniel Wagner, Four Years After Gaddafi, Libya Is a FailedState,
FOREIGN POLICY IN Focus (Apr. 6, 2015), http://fpif.org/four-years-after-gaddafi-libya-is-a-
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controlling the capital city from the west, and is composed primarily of
Islamist militias from the city of Misrata and linked to extremist groups
known as the "Dawn Forces" who are connected to detached previous
member of government General Khalifa Hafter. 5
The internationally recognized government is deteriorating and
practically incapable of carrying out its functions which has led to tribal
battles over land, presumably through interrupting oil exploration and
shipments that have led to devastating economic costs to the state. The
head of the Libyan NOC, Mustafa Sanala has estimated that as of January
2015, Libya has been producing only 330,000 barrels of oil per day
compared to the 1.6 million barrels per day it produced just after the 2011
revolution. 6 Interestingly, clashes in different territories cannot be solely
attributed to Islamist extremists' thwart of power, rather embedded within
there are tribal and indigenous efforts to prove existence, and more
importantly possession, or at least, connection to their land.
Clashes between the Tuareg and Tebu tribes, indigenous in Libya's
southern desert are one example. 7 While the Tuareg tribe was perceived
to be pro-Gadhafi, the Tebu supported the rebels against Gadhafi.
Consequently, acts of retaliation were committed against the Tuaregs of
Libya, such as the battle in the town of Ubari. This retaliation has in most
instances ultimately led to Tuaregs' enforced international displacement. 9
In a letter from Human Rights Watch to the Misrata Local Council, the
former announced it was worried about the Misraten thuwar (rebel)
attacks on the Tawergha (Tuareg community) as being of a widespread
and systematic nature, raising the issue of crimes against humanity
having been committed against them.o They were driven away from the
lands they claimed to occupy in Libya's southwest Saharan desert area
embracing the El Shararaoil fields and escaping to neighboring countries
like Tunisia or even Mali. And as a result, militias control security and
access to the oil fields there and in many other areas." The El Sharara
failed-state/.
5. David Arnold, Libya Now Divided Over Tribe, Militias, andLand, VOICE OF AMERICA
(Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.voanews.com/content/libya-oil-divided-country/2613861.html.
6. Libya Oil Production Plummets as Tribes fight to Control Field in South, MIAMI
HERALD (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/article801440

4.html.
7. A Fierce Battle for Control in Libya's Desert, ALJAZEERA ENGLISH, Dec. 5, 2014,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/12/fierce-battle-control-libya-desert-20141259

1647138535.html.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Libya: Letter to Misrata Councils, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 8, 2012),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/08/libya-letter-misrata-councils (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).

11.

Joe Friedrichsen, Libyan militia seizes major oil field, ECHO (Nov. 15, 2014),
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oil field, like many other oil fields in Libya, has witnessed shutdowns by
the operating companies like the Spanish giant Repsol SA, because of the
tense security conditions and threats from these local communities. 12 One
of the main justifications for such retaliatory acts is lack of just
distribution of the oil revenues in these territories, not to mention the lack
of government representation and broader constitutional demands.
Conditions do not seem at all reassuring when it comes to either armed
forces or police forces. While the armed forces have been estimated at
about 76,000 personnel, it has been found that they are actually only
about 20,000 with an outdated arsenal and lack of expertise.' 3 They were
predominantly trained to protect the previous Gadhafi regime from any
uprisings, so these military positions were filled based on tribal affiliation
and loyalty to the regime rather than actual military qualifications. 14 The
same goes for the People's Security Force, Libya's police force, which
was estimated to be about 45,000 personnel, but in reality their numbers
are significantly less.1 5 Like the armed forces, they also lack expertise,
up-to-date weaponry, and are tainted with the ideology of regimeoriented protection. 16 It is simply logical that a new regime would use
these same weaknesses, or in the case of the new regime, perceived
strengths to maintain power. But if this were the case then the actual
security and protection of state facilities themselves, and more
importantly for the sake of this Article, the foreign investments, would be
in danger.
Because of Gadhafi's Arabization policy, his reign was particularly
rough on the aforementioned Tebu and Tuareg tribes and other minorities
such as the Amazigh, also known as the Berbers of Libya's Saharan
Desert area. This Arabization movement was even more viable in Libya's
current "fractured," "fragmented," and de facto "decentralized" phase.
Even though the Gadhafi regime appeared to be a rough centralized "one
man's show," the current ruling bifurcated governments are busy defying
each other, and foreign investor corporations are lost in the midst of a
threat to their survival that includes their safety and economic stability.
While extreme violence and dangerous tensions persist and one
internationally recognized but nevertheless weak government is present,
the extractive industry in Libya is seemingly unattractive to corporations.
http://theechonews.com/libyan-militia-seizes-major-oil-field/.
12. Benoit Faucon, Eni, Repsol ExpatriatesEvacuatedfrom Libya, WALL ST. J. (July 20,
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/eni-repsol-expatriates-evacuated-from-libya-1405893922.
13. Florence Gaub, A Libyan Recipefor Disaster, 56 SURVIVAL: GLOBAL POL. & STRATEGY

J. 101, 104 (2014).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 104-05.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol28/iss1/2

6

Alreshaid: Revisiting the Notion of Full Protection and Security of Foreign

2016]

REVISITNG THE NOTION OF FULL PROTECTION AND SECUR1IY

69

One of the primary concerns is ensuring their safety within this hostile
environment which in this context refers to both the physical safety of
their personnel and facilities, as well as to their oil shipments and
interests. If safety is not addressed, corporations may simply decide to
divest their interests. Which begs the question, should they? In fact, there
may be other solutions and possible alternatives.
Needless to say, in this instance violence is surely not the demand of
the general Libyan population. The problem appears when governing
militias' inordinate intentions to dictate blend in with those of other local
communities, whilst the GNC gazes with confusion. This factual ground
further poses the challenges this study sets to discuss.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF FULL PROTECTION AND SECURITY IN
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION

The notion of full protection and security has gradually increased as a
field of discussion within the investor-state arbitration realm and in some
sense has begun to mitigate the "exclusive" relevant importance the
notion of fair and equitable treatment used to monopolize.1 7 However,
this importance may have intensified with current escalated global
violence, such as that posed by the Arab Spring, ensuing conflicts in
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Brief insight into the evolution of this notion
and its comparative approach across multiple treaties and jurisprudential
indoctrination is useful in as much as it can guide the Libyan situation.
A. Legal Doctrineson Full Protectionand Security
Both Bilateral and Multilateral Investment Treaties (BITs & MITs)
have codified the notion of full protection and security in their provisions.
The purpose of these provisions is to ensure protection is provided for
investors, to better operate in the host state, as well as to the host state
itself, in order to guarantee that outer boundaries of what it bears the
burden of providing are clear, and most importantly reasonable with some
regulated form of discretion in line with its capabilities.
To start off, the Energy Charter Treaty of 1994 outlined this notion in
Article 10(1), in a way that is within the context of fair and equitable
treatment, by providing:
Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of
17. See Mahnaz Malik, The Full Protection and Security StandardComes of Age: Yet
Another Challengefor States in Investment Treaty Arbitration?,IISD: Best Practices Series, Nov.
2011, at 1.
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this Treaty, encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and
transparent conditions for Investors of other Contracting Parties to
make Investments in its Area. Such conditions shall include a
commitment to accord at all times to Investments of Investors of
other Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment. Such
Investments shall also enjoy the most constant protection and
security and no Contracting Party shall in any way impair by
unreasonable or discriminatory measures their management,
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal. In no case shall such
Investments be accorded treatment less favourable than that
required by international law, including treaty obligations.' 8
The notion of full protection and security was identified within the
phrase "constant protection and security." As for a more regional
economic pact, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had
undergone an evolutionary stage where it began with broad language
leaving it to the parties of the Agreement to expand it. Ultimately, there
was an interpretive statement in 2001 by the NAFTA Free Trade
Commission, which confined its boundaries to the minimum standard of
treatment given to aliens in customary international law.19
As a result, both the U.S and Canadian model BITs implemented this
minimum standard approach and no more than that. The U.S. Model BIT2004 and the current 2012 version-in Article 5(2/b) clarifies that this
standard would require a state party to provide, "the level of police
protection required under customary international law." 20
The Association of Southeast East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Investment Agreement of 2009 stresses that full protection and security
would oblige states to take measures in a "reasonable way," hence no
strict liability is acknowledged.2 1 In comparison, other regional
investment treaties such as the Southern African Development
Community Finance and Investment Protocol of 2006 and the Investment
Agreement for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
Common Investment Area of 2007 omit this notion from their
provisions.2 2

18.
19.

Energy Charter Treaty art. 10(1), Dec. 17, 1994, 36113 U.N.T.S. 2080.
Id. at 2. The 1992 NAFTA broad provision in art. 1105(1) expressed that the parties

"shall accord to investments of another Party treatment in accordance with international law,
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security."

20. Id. at 3.
2 1. Id.
22. Id. at 4.
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B. Relevant Jurisprudence
International arbitral tribunals have assessed the previous legal
doctrines and applied them to cases where this notion was raised. With
regards to the standard of liability on the state, full protection and security
does not generally impose absolute strict liability, rather it stems from the
requirement to take "reasonable" measures, which would better be
identified in the context of "due-diligence." 23 The ElettronicaSicula SpA
(ELSI) (United States v. Italy) case by the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) enforced such a standard.2 4 The Court in this case underscored,
"'constant protection and security' cannot be construed as the giving of a
warranty that property shall never in any circumstances be occupied or
disturbed." 25 A protest following the closure of the ELSI corporation
plant and the dismissal of its 800 workers did not mean to the Court that
the Italian authorities' measures to fully protect this plant and sustain its
production will always fall short of the full protection and security
standard.2 6
The Asian Agricultural Products, Ltd (AAPL) v. Sri Lanka of 1990
case also declared such a standard by explaining:
The Tribunal declares unfounded the Claimant's main plea aiming
to consider the Government of Sri Lanka assuming strict liability
under Article 2.(2) of the Bilateral Investment Treaty, without any
need to prove that the damages suffered were attributable to the
State or its agents, and to establish the State's responsibility for not
acting with "due diligence." 2 7
AAPL v. Sri Lanka concerned escalated violence during the Tamil
insurrection between the Sri Lankan forces and insurgents leading to the
death of twenty of AAPL's employees and destruction of a shrimp farm.
The Tribunal, nevertheless, could not establish whether the rebels or the
Sri Lankan security forces were directly responsible for the damages, but
they did determine that the state was in fact obliged to prevent them. 2 8
This same standard was reiterated in Wena Hotels v. Egypt before the
same International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
23. Christoph Schreuer, The Protection of Investments in Armed Conflicts, 3 TRANSNAT'L
Disp. MGMT. 1, 8 (2012).
24. Case Concerning ElettronicaSicula S.p.A. (United States v. It.), Reports of Judgments,

1989 I.C.J. 15, 1108 (July 20).
25.

Id.

26. Id.
27. Asian Agric. Prods., Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final
Award, T 53 (June 27, 1990), 4 ICSID Rep. 246.
28.

Malik, supra note 17, at 5.
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(ICSID) Tribunal. In Wena, two of the investor's hotels were forcibly
seized and the Egyptian government did not take appropriate measures to
prevent the seizure, which was in fact committed by two employees of a
state agency (EHC) using sticks, although not attributed to the state.2 9
The Tribunal explained:
The Tribunal agrees with Wena that Egypt violated its obligation
under Article 2(2) of the IPPA to accord Wena's investment "fair.
and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security."
Although it is not clear that Egyptian officials other than officials
of EHC directly participated in the April 1, 1991 seizures, there is
substantial evidence that Egypt was aware of EHC's intentions to
seize the hotels and took no actions to prevent EHC from doing so.
Moreover, once the seizures occurred, both the police and the
Ministry of Tourism took no immediate action to restore the hotels
promptly to Wena's control. Finally, Egypt never imposed
substantial sanctions on EHC or its senior officials, suggesting
Egypt's approval of EHC's actions. 3 0
In Tecmed v. Mexico31 and Noble Ventures v. Romania,3 2 both
tribunals decided that the Mexican and Romanian governments were not
held responsible for demonstrations and protests by non-state actors since
there was no sufficient evidence to the contrary. 3 3
These cases confirm the host-state's obligation to protect foreign
investors and their interests in certain circumstances where even nonstate actors may have been involved in threatening the security of the
investment. In fact, in some cases, such as Biwater Gauff v. Tanzinia34
and AMT v. Zaire,3 5 state actors or their subsidiaries could also be
involved in such breaches. 3 6 These cases mainly discuss the threat and
29. Wena Hotels, Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award, T1
33, 34, 47, 48, 84 (Dec. 8, 2000), 41 I.L.M. 896 (2002).
30. Id. at 911-12.
31. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 177 (May 29, 2003), 219 ICSID Rev. 158 (2004).
32. Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID CaseNo. ARB/01/1 1, Award,¶ 166 (Oct. 12,
2005), http://arbitration.org/sites/default/files/awards/arbr-2006-261 - I.pdf.
33. Malik, supra note 17, at 6.
34. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania), Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 730 (July 24, 2008).
35.

¶ 177

Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, ICSIJD Case No. ARB/93/1, Award,

(Feb. 21, 1997), 5 ICSID Rep. 11 (1997).
36. Schreuer, supra note 23, at 4-5. It is also worth noting that, in the case of L.ES.I. S.p.A.

et ASTALDI S.p.A. c/ Ripublique algirienne dimocratique et populaire [LESI v. Algeria], the
tribunal also considered the prevailing circumstances in Algeria. In that case, the Algerian

authorities exerted their security efforts in the risky and isolated region of Wilaya do Bouira,
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actual damage posed by physical violence as opposed to the more
controversial and recently debated theme of whether legal security too
would fall under the auspices of full protection and security. 3 7 Even so,
the extant article focuses on physical security, which is the issue in
current day Libya.
IV. INTERPLAY OF LEGAL DOCTRINEs ENDEAVOR TO ACHIEVE FULL
PROTECTION AND SECURITY IN LIBYA

Part III was an attempt to explain the factual, doctrinal, and
jurisprudential background of this doctrine in an effort to apply these
concepts to circumstances such as present day Libya. Consequently, the
Post-Gadhafi period should be assessed in light of different approaches
in order to ensure that full protection and security for foreign investors is
not lost in translation because of a complex situation. This kind of
analysis could also serve as a guide for future similar situations in a tense
and unfortunately violent world.
A. The ILC Articles on State Responsibility
The U.N. International Law Commission's (ILC) Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Articles)
of 2001 are extremely relevant to the Libyan situation. These articles
provide guidance into who bears the responsibility of providing full
security and protection and what constitutes a breach.
Article 1 provides that the substance of the breach must be
"internationally" wrongful acts.3 8 The state organ bears the burden of
such responsibility and must address it in their legislative, judicial or
enforcement capacities. Also of relevance is whether the state has central
government status or is in fact provincial.3 9
The other relevant article, Article 9, addresses situations where a
person or group exercises governmental authority when official
authorities are defunct or absent. 4 0 This may be the case when state
institutions collapse or become incapable of reaching certain areas of the
country that may be deemed hostile because of the control of a certain
clashing with certain terrorist organizations in relation to the notion of fair and equitable

treatment. LESI v. Algeria, ICSID Case No. No ARB/05/3, Award,
37.
38.

¶

165-80 (Nov. 12, 2008).

See Schreuer, supranote 23, at 5-8.
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Int'l Law Comm'n, 63d

Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, at art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, Supp. No. 10 (2001).
39. Id. art. 4. See also id. at 5-8. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 63d Sess., Apr. 23-June 1,
July 2-Aug. 10, art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, Supp. No. 10 (2001).
40.

Id. art. 9.
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rebel group(s) (i.e., present day Libya).
Lastly, Article 11 of the ILC Articles speaks in many ways to the
current Libyan playfield.41 This Article discusses the conduct of an
insurrectional or similar movement and stipulates:
1. The conduct of an insurrectional movement, which becomes the
new Government of a State shall be considered an act of that State
under international law.
2. The conduct of a movement, insurrectional or other, which
succeeds in establishing a new State in part of the territory of a preexisting State or in a territory under its administration shall be
considered an act of the new State under international law.
3. This article is without prejudice to the attribution to a State of
any conduct, however related to that of the movement concerned,
which is to be considered an act of that State by virtue of articles 4
to 9.42

This Article, in its three sub-paragraphs, clearly anticipates a new
rebel revolutionary movement, which aims and later succeeds in
replacing the ruling government. The GNC did precisely that in
connection with the Gadhafi regime in 2011, and was consequently
internationally recognized for its new governmental role, back when it
started off as the National Transitional Council (NTC) and later
transformed into the GNC.43
Regarding Libya, what changes these clear facts is a current
overlapping governmental role where a de facto insurgency claimed
control over certain territories, most importantly the capital city Tripoli.
So, the conduct of a successful militia insurrectional movement along
with the acts of the previous Gadhafi government, are attributed to the
State. The question remains, which government is responsible if
claimants are to invoke full protection and security?
Rules on state governance are aligned with discussions regarding the
formation of a state itself in some ways. The criteria of a state, embodied
in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933,
sets a list of still controversial criteria to be met through: (1) a permanent
41. Id art. 11.
42. Id.
43. The U.N. Security Council in Resolution 2009 (2011) did "implicitly" recognize the
NTC as the legitimate representative of the state albeit this did not actually come up until the
armed conflict with the Gadhafi regime ended with the victory of the NTC affiliates. Daniella
Dam-de Jong, Armed Opposition Groups and the Rights to Exercise Control over PublicNatural
Resources: A Legal Analysis of the Cases of Libya and Syria, 62 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 1,

13(2015).
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population; (2) a defined territory; (3) government; and (4) capacity to
enter into relations with the other states.4 4 As for states, governments also
have to exert effective control or authority over territories. In addition,
there is the controversial international recognition element, whether it
would be seen as a "constitutive" or "declaratory" act, with some
polarization towards the latter. 45 Recognition is often declaratory of the
facts discussing the emergence of the state, and constitutive in so far as
rights and duties are generated for the new state in relation with the
recognized one. 4 6 As such, although the Tobruk-based government is
internationally recognized and, in some parts of the state, effectively
controls those areas, the Tripoli-based and predominantly militia-run
government also exerts effective control over territories of the country
but, as of the time this article was written, it lacks international
recognition.
With the current Libyan climate being susceptible to further political
changes, the GNC would be more apt than the other defacto government
to bear the responsibility of fully protecting and securing the investments
in the state. It is, nevertheless, debated in the international law realmalbeit not as firmly as suggested-that premature recognition of an
opposition group (such as the new government in place in Libya) is
prohibited as notice to other states that they cannot change their policy
whenever it suits their interests.4 7 As such, the established authorities
would legitimately remain representative of the state as long as the armed
conflict persists and remains undecided, provided legal title exists, which
is generally assumed for newly established authorities. 48 State
recognition is really a political statement after all. The de jure
government remains authorized to effectively represent the state, which
includes the exploitation of its natural resources (e.g., oil), reserved for
state governance. 4 9
Some have called for resorting to the concept of usufruct, or the law
of the occupant, in order to justify a current government's position-even
where its main components are armed groups-for administering its
natural resources in the territories it controls. This administration should
qualify as a "civilian" administration," which the state and foreign
investments need in the midst of internal armed conflict. According to
44. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, signed on Dec. 26,
1933 and entered intoforce on Dec. 26, 1934 [hereinafter the Montevideo Convention].
45. ANDREw CLAPHAM, BRUERLY's LAW OF NATIONS 150-51 (7th ed. 2012).

46. Id. at 153.
47.

Dam-de Jong, supra note 43, at 9.

48. Id. at 9-11.
49.

Id. at 10.

50.

Id. at 19-21.
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Article 1 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, this recourse would still be
subject to the requirement of maintaining effective control and taking
measures "to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and
safety . . . ."5 1 This, in and of itself, is arguable. The previous facts on the
Libyan situation question this ability.
It is also worth considering whether the international community's
pre-judgment through non-recognition applies to this defacto insurgency
movement when it maintains affiliation with extremist movements like
Al Qaeda, ISIL, etc. Resolution 2170 of the U.N. Security Council
Resolutions prohibits any support, commercial interaction, and
recognition of such terrorist -based groups. 5 2
One fact is clear: legal rights and duties remain effective with a change
in government, even where an insurrectional movement seizes power.
The Tinoco Concessionscase in 1923 affirmed the principle of continuity
when an internal policy or government is changed, which does not affect
its status under international law. After a coup d'dtat in Costa Rica, the
new government issued what was called the "Law of Nullities,"
nullifying all contracts entered into by the previous Tinoco regime. 53 in
Libya, the post-Gadhafi NTC government has actually pledged to uphold
the previously negotiated oil concessions and contracts generally, and has
not withheld its right to investigate allegations of corruption related to
these negotiations. 5 4
B. BITs Well Drafted?
While the ILC Articles could set the Libyan framework as to a state's
51.

This article states that the occupant "shall take all the measures in his power to restore,

and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country." Id at 21.

52. The "Libya Dawn" or "Fajr Libya" does not actually seem to recognize ISIS
specifically. Clashes have been undergoing since February 2015 between the two groups in order
for the former to supposedly restore security in the Sirte area after the latter claimed control of
the area. The Libya Dawn seemingly stresses a zero toleration policy toward terrorism. What is
controversial, however, is its link with the Islamist group called "Ansar al-Sharia," which was
deemed a terrorist organization by the United Nations. Libya Dawn militia in rareclash with ISIS,
AL ARABiYA NEWS MIDDLE EAST, Mar. 14, 2015, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-

east/2015/03/14/Powerful-Libyan-militia-alliance-in-rare-clash-with-ISIS-.html (last visited Feb.
I1, 2016). See also S.C. Res. 2170, U.N. SCOR, 7242d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/2170 (Aug. 15,
2014); S.C. Res. 2009, U.N. SCOR, 6620th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/2009 (Sept. 16, 2011); S.C.
Res. 1970, U.N. SCOR, 6491st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
53.

Aguilar-Amory and Royal Bank of Canada claims (Great Britain v. Costa Rica), 1

R.I.A.A. 369, 376 (1923).
54.

War Damage to Hit Return of Libya Crude, FIN. TIMES, June 9, 2011, http://

www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/c382946a-d7b5-1leO-aO6b-00144feabdcO.html#axzz3zpmaer9l
visited Feb. 11, 2016).
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responsibility for "internationally" wrongful acts, it would be the purview
of the BITs to include and specify what those wrongful acts would pertain
to, a form of lex specialis. When briefly identifying the BITs concluded
by Libya, there have been provisions that support claims to assure the full
protection and security of the investor as opposed to the host state.5 5
Libya is party to twenty-two BITs currently in force; these include
agreements with Austria, Belarus, Belgium-Luxemburg, Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Germany, India, Iran, Italy, Malta,
Morocco, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Syria,
and Turkey. They have also signed another sixteen BITs with Algeria,
China, Congo, Croatia, Gambia, Indonesia, Kenya, Korea, Malta, Qatar,
San Marino, Slovakia, South Africa, Tunisia, Ukraine, and the United
Kingdom, which are not yet in force. 5 6
The Croatia-Libya BIT in Article 2, provides a very specific clause:
Investments made by investors of either Contracting Party shall
enjoy full legal protection and security in the territory of the other
Contracting Party. Neither Contracting Party shall in any way
impair by unreasonable arbitrary or discriminatory measures the
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of
investments of investors of the other Contracting party in its
territory. 57

The Libya-Portugal BIT also pushes for non-discrimination in cases
of civil strife and armed conflict, and essentially contain either a national
treatment standard or a most-favored nation treatment standard. Article 7
of this BIT stipulates:
55. One interesting piece of information is that the new Libyan Draft Constitution
contained a chapter on "Transitional Justice Measures." In one of its provisions addressing the

right to compensation, the state commits itself to compensating victims and affected parties,
individuals, groups, or regions in proportion to the harm or damage done, which applies to military
operations and armed conflicts. Further, it commits itself to:
Guaranteeing the rights of persons whose property or movable assets have been
illegally taken away. In the case of property, the elements that should be taken
into account are the rights of the original owner, the financial position of the
person who has illegally taken the property, the constructions added to the
property and the previous administrative and judicial procedures ....
LBYAN DRAFT CONSTITUTION Sept. 12, 2014, ch. I (Libya), http://www.constitutionnet.org/
vl/item/libya-initial-draft-constitution-2014-english (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
56. UNCTAD, International Investment Agreement Navigator: Libya, http://investment
policyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/ 1l9 (last visited May 3, 2015).
57. Vasiliki P. Karzi, The Protection of Foreign Investment DuringArmed Conflict: The

Libya War 23 (2012) (Master of Advanced Studies Thesis, Leiden Univ.).
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Each Party shall provide to investors of the other Party, whose
investments suffer losses in the territory of the first Party owing to
war or armed conflict, revolution, a state of national emergency,
disobedience or disturbances or any other event considered as
such, treatment that restitutes the conditions of these investments
that existed before the damage had occurred, or compensation, or
any other settlement that is no less favourable than that Party
accords to the investments of its own investors, or of any third
State, whichever is more favourable. Any payment made under
this article shall be, without delay, freely transferable in
convertible currency."
Likewise, the Austria-Libya BIT includes a similar provision that
applies mainly to government forces or authorities rather than non-state
actors such as militias. Article 5 embodies this clause:
(1) An investor of a Contracting Party who has suffered a loss
relating to its investment in the territory of the other Contracting
Party due to war or to other armed conflict, state of emergency,
revolution, insurrection, civil disturbance, or any other similar
event, or acts of God or force majeure, in the territory of the latter
Contracting Party, shall be accorded by the latter Contracting
Party, as regards restitution, indemnification, compensation or any
other settlement, treatment no less favourable than that which it
accords to its own investors or to investors of any third state,
whichever is most favourable to the investor.
(2) An investor of a Contracting Party who in any of the events
referred to in paragraph (1) suffers loss resulting from:
(a) requisitioning of its investment or part thereof by the forces or
authorities of the other Contracting Party, or
(b) destruction of its investment or part thereof by the forces or
authorities of the other Contracting Party, which was not required
by the necessity of the situation, shall in any case be accorded by
the latter Contracting Party restitution or compensation which in
either case shall be prompt, adequate and effective and, with
respect to compensation, shall be in accordance with Article 4 (2)
and (3).59
C. Any Exceptions that Libya Can Invoke?
It seems the notion of full protection and security has been well
58.
59.

Schreuer, supra note 23, at 10.
Id. at 11-12.
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protected and has support in legal doctrines such as Libya's BITs,
jurisprudence, and the ILC Articles. One question remains, can Libya, as
a host state, invoke any exceptions in order to circumvent what full
protection and security implies and requires of the state? The chaos in
Libya certainly seems to have gotten out of hand, where a government
would find itself at least incapacitated when it comes to abiding by its
contractual and treaty obligations.
In this regard, it is necessary to discuss reasons that may be raised as
exceptions to providing full protection and security by the state to the
investors. These exceptions include: special BIT clauses on the one hand,
and both necessity andforce majeure as general reasons on the other.
1. BIT Clauses
As a segue to the more controversial grounds for exceptions from the
duty to provide full protection and security, there are specific provisions
within a BIT that strictly identify circumstances where the host state
would no longer be burdened by this obligation. These clauses balance
the risk between a somewhat weak and worried investor as opposed to a
strong but resource limited state. 6 0
One example of such a clause would be the Belgium-Libya BIT,
which in Article 3 stipulates:
2. Except for measures required to maintain public order, these
investments shall enjoy continuous protection and security, i.e.
excluding any unjustified or discriminatory measure which could
hinder, either in law or in practice, the management, maintenance,
61
use, possession or liquidation thereof.
2. Force Majeure
In the chapter on Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness, the ILC
Articles include force majeure as one such reason, stating:
1. The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an
international obligation of that State is precluded if the act is due
60. So-called "national security" clauses are not at all unique to the world of BITs. Art. XI,
for instance, of the U.S.-Argentina BIT addresses this meaning: "This Treaty shall not preclude
the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the
fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace
or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests." Similar provisions are found

in NAFTA art. 2102, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, and the Energy Charter Treaty in art. 24(3). Id.
at 14-16.
61. Karzi, supra note 57, at 34.
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to force majeure, that is the occurrence of an irresistible force or
of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, making it
materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the
obligation.
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if:
(a) the situation of force majeure is due, either alone or in
combination with other factors, to the conduct of the State
invoking it; or
(b) the State has assumed the risk of that situation occurring. 62
This provision identifiesforce majeure as being "the occurrence of an
irresistible force or of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the
State, making it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform
the obligation." This defense could be seen as a general principle of
international law. 63 As it applies to the Libyan "two-government" state,
while the GNC is the likely representative of the state as previously
discussed, would this mean that there was a loss of territorial control to
belligerent movements? In turn, would this mean that the state in these
circumstances could perhaps claim a defense offorce majeure?M
In Toto Costruzioni v. Lebanon, the Tribunal noted the fact that the
long delay in court proceedings due to ongoing terrorist attacks, a war
with Israel, and internal battles, would lead the Tribunal to not being able
to exercise its jurisdiction over the claims. 6 5
It should be noted that force majeure is not an absolute unrestricted
defense. The Autopista v. Venezuela Tribunal defined three requirements
for a successful claim on this ground. This included (1) impossibility,
where the performance was made impossible to achieve, (2)
unforeseeability, and (3) non-attributability, where the events were not
attributable to the defeating party.6 6 This pertained to the events in
Venezuela that involved riots and civil unrest to proposed toll increases.
The Tribunal decided to reject Venezuela's claim of force majeure
because the strong public resistance was not apparent at the time the
Concession Agreement was signed.6 7
62.

53 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).

63.

See Karzi, supra note 57, at 39 (citing Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal: Anaconda-Iran, Ltd

v. Iran, 13 Iran-U.S. CTR 1986, § 43; Mobil Oil Iran Inc. v. Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. CTR 1987, § 117;
European Court of Justice: Denkavit Belgie NV v. Belgium, 1987, Case 145/85, ECR 565;
Comm'n v. Italy, 1985, Case 101/84, ECR 2629).
64. Id. at 40.
65. Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. Republic of Leb., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12,
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶T 165-68, (Sept. 11, 2009).
66. Autopista Concesionada De Venezuela, C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/5, Award, ¶ 108 (Sept. 23, 2003).
67. Id.¶T116-19.
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Nevertheless, the Libyan situation has tended to change frequently
and has generally become more intense, which eventually would make
this defense more plausible to a certain degree. But perhaps more
controversial would be debating whether the GNC would have been in a
situation where the hostile events are actually foreseeable and a nexus
could be drawn as to attribute the incidents to its conduct. The GNC could
be perceived to have insisted on a non-inclusive government and unfair
and inequitable distribution of its natural resources (i.e., oil revenues,
throughout the ongoing new constitution-drafting period).
3. Necessity
Necessity, the other exception to the full protection and security
obligation was also embodied in the ILC Articles. Accordingly, this
defense would only be successful if the act:
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest
against a grave and imminent peril; and
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or
States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international
community as a whole. 6 8
Such grounds would be precluded as in force majeure when the state
contributes to the situation of necessity. 69
In order to acknowledge the application of the necessity rule, the
current situation in Libya must first be assessed as an armed conflict.
With the existence of the Gadhafi regime, the conflict in Libya during the
2011 revolution began as a non-international armed conflict. 7 0 The
conflict then became an international armed conflict when U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1973 (2011) authorized the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) to intervene.7 1
In this respect,jus in bello, international humanitarian law (IHL) rules
apply.7 2 Amongst the most important requirements for an acceptable
hostile attack are that the attack be: (1) necessary, and (2) proportionate
73
"in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."
68.
69.

53 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
Id.

70.

See ENGLISH, supra note 7.

71.

See generally S.C. Res. 1973, (Mar. 17, 2011).

72. Julian M. Lehmann, All Necessary Means to Protect Civilians: What the Intervention
in Libya Says About the Relationship Between the Jus in Bello and the Jus ad Bellum, 77 J.
CONFLICT SEC. L. 117, 118-19 (2012).
73. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the

Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 51 & 57, June 8, 1977, ICRC,
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IHL also protects property by referring to "military objectives." This
protection would include:
1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals.
Civilian objects are all objects which are not military objectives as
defined in paragraph 2.
2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far
as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling
at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 74
The Libyan scenario, at least in relation to the notion of full protection
and security in connection to oil concessions granted to foreign investors,
would not seem to be a permissible military object. Rather, oil terminals
in Libya and their facilities would be at odds with necessitating a direct
anticipated military advantage. The necessity defense would not be the
best ground for the host-state government to invoke, especially since it
would not in itself take responsibility for non-state actors' hostile acts.
Even if the latter succeed in attaining governmental status, the result
would remain the same.
D. PoliticalRisk Insurance to Supplement the Situation
In hostile environments like Libya, political risk insurance is an
additional factor worth looking into when balancing the risks investors
face and the gains they anticipate. Political risk insurance could be
referred to as a private-market insurance guarantee from armed conflicts
or other force majeure-like causes that put the implementation of
investments at a high-risk status quo. 7 5
A major source of coverage and guarantee for such environments is
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). 7 6 MIGA is a
member of the World Bank Group, and one of its main activities is to
Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsflStates.xsp?
xpviewStates=XPagesNORMStatesParties&xp treatySelected=470 (last visited Feb. 7, 2016)

[hereinafter Additional Protocol 1]. Libya is a party to this Protocol, which applies to noninternational armed conflicts since June 8, 1977.
74. Additional Protocol 1, supra note 73, art. 52.
75. Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Some Legal ConsiderationsforE. U Based MNEs Contemplating
High Risk ForeignDirectInvestments in the Energy Sector after Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum

and Chevron Corporation v. Naranjo, 9 S.C. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 161, 188 (2013).
76.

Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, https://www.migaorg/who-we-are (last

visited Feb. 7, 2016) [hereinafter MIGA].
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insure investors in high-risk situations. 77
War, terrorism, and civil disturbances are some of the types of
coverage MIGA undertakes. 78 Rather than the notion of full protection
and security, investigating the conditions in which investments are
covered in situations of war, terrorism, or civil disturbances could be a
viable solution to investor fears.
At the outset, it is important to point out that MIGA's Operational
Policies, that coverage applies even when the host state government is a
de facto government over the territory where the investment is located,
and in situations where foreign investment might be put into jeopardy
because the host government takes or fails to take action. 7 9
The military action or armed conflict, which would be covered
against, would include "hostilities between armed forces of governments
of different countries or, in the case of civil war, between armed forces
of rival governments in the same country, including both declared and
undeclared wars." 8 0
In regards to civil disturbances, as previously mentioned in the BITs,
there is some broad coverage basis that would comply with components
of the notion of full protection and security.8 1 The Operational Policies in
terms of civil disturbances, indicate:
1.48 Coverage against civil disturbance shall include organized
violence directed against the government of the Host Country that
has as its objective the overthrow of such government or its ouster
from a specific region, including revolutions, rebellions,
insurrections and coups d'6tat.
1.49 (a) Coverage may also be provided against civil disturbance,
which takes the form of:
(i) riot: an assemblage of individuals who commit public acts of
violence in defiance of lawful authority;
(ii) civil commotion: events which have all the characteristics of a
riot but which are more widespread and of longer duration without,
however, attaining the status of civil war, revolution, rebellion or
insurrection; or
(iii) terrorism: events of terrorism and sabotage.
(b) The violent acts or events referred to in this paragraph may be
77.
78.

Id
MIGA, Types of Coverage, https://www.miga.org/Pages/Investment%20Guarantees/

Overview/TypesOfCoverage.aspx#toc3 (last visited May 5, 2015).
79. MIGA, OperationalPolicies, 12 (2015) (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
80. Id. at 15.
81. Energy Charter Treaty Trade Amendment art. 10, Energy Charter Secretariat,
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/laws/italaw6101(35).pdf.
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directed at the Host Government, at a foreign government or
foreign investment, including the government of the investor's
country or the nationality of the investor.
1.50 In all cases, the civil disturbance must have been caused or
carried out by groups primarily pursuing broad political or
ideological objectives. Acts undertaken to further labor, student or
other specific interests and acts of kidnapping or similar acts
directed against the Guarantee Holder shall not qualify for
coverage as civil disturbance, but, if politically motivated, may be
covered if the Board so decides under Paragraph 1.24(c) above. 82
The Operational Policies concerning civil disturbances insist that
groups involved in such disturbances have some sort of "intent" to pursue
"broad political or ideological objectives." 83 Generally, the intent would
have to fall under the category of "political motivation."84 This would not
be difficult to establish in post-Gadhafi Libya, where certain militia
groups supporting the Libyan Dawn pursue ideologies in connection to
terrorist groups, such as ISIL, in order to "wipe out" what are perceived
as Muslim territories from "Western imperialism."85 As such, foreign
investors would, in some fallacious sense, serve.
Also interesting is the phrase, "[c]overage may be extended to losses
due to business interruption, including operating costs and lost net
income." 86 In situations where rebel or militia groups prevent shipment
of oil and oil transportation, or obstruct exploration or exploitation
operations that lead to drastic economic losses, the coverage would be
beneficial; however, coverage could become so widespread to the point
that its continuation would be threatened.
So, what does this tell us about Libya? MIGA's World Investment and
Political Risk Report 2013 clearly identifies the MENA region as one
active area in which civil disturbance, armed conflict, and terrorism are
viable coverage reasons, precisely at the current stage after witnessing
political turmoil as a result of the Arab Spring.8 7 Moreover, half of the
claims in 2011 were attributed to political violence in the MENA area,
with MIGA paying an amount of $179 million.8 8 Libya itself
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 16.

85. Andreas Wigger, EncounteringPerceptions in Parts of the Muslim World and Their
Impact on the ICRC's Ability to Effective, 87 INT'L REV. RED CROSs 343, 34749, 358 (2005).

86.

Id. at 16.

87.

MIGA, World Investment and Political Risk Report, 23-25 (2013), www.miga.org/

Documents/WIPRI 3.pdf.
88. Id. at 36.
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monopolized 22% of such claims in 2012, an amount totaling $27

million.89
This discussion should not imply that the relationship between the
foreign investors and the Libyan state are the only insurance policies
guaranteed by other agencies when it comes to full protection and
security. In such dangerous times when legal discussions about the extent
of full protection and security have hit their peak, this political risk
insurance debate would provide a viable solution for these foreign
investors.

V. CONCLUSION

This Article has attempted to touch on the notion of full protection
and security when it is most needed. The deteriorating situation in postGadhafi Libya is proof of the difficult test the notion will undergo. The
prevailing condition is a two-government state in which militias
predominate, with one that is internationally recognized, but is
nevertheless in an institutionally collapsed status quo. 9 0
Relatively recent discussions have remarked on the evolution of full
protection and security. Legal doctrines and jurisprudence have, albeit
minimally perhaps, engaged in assessing the implementation of this
notion in various contexts within different regions of the world. The
stable general standards and understanding of full protection and security,
which have yet to come to fruition, may have been substituted with clear
BIT provisions, which is certainly a well-approached solution to ensure
parties' autonomy when it comes to unstable conditions.
After acknowledging that full protection and security is not an
absolute notion, and that it falls under certain exceptions, including
special BIT provisions, force majeure, or necessity, it is critical that
significant emphasis be placed on the need for a balance between both
the foreign investors' interests and those of the host state Libya. As in
LESI v. Algeria,9 1 the regional context where the investments were
located should be accounted for when putting full protection and security
to the test of reasonableness and due diligence that Libya would have a
duty to undertake. 9 2 The complete loss of control over certain Libyan
89. Id.
90.

Arnold, supra note 5.

91.

L.E.S.I.-DIPENTA v. Algeria,

Case No. ARB/03/08, Award, (ICSID 2005),

www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4321.pdf.

92. Id TT 115-17, 165-80. In Pantechniki S.A. Constractors & Eng'rs (Greece) v. The
Republic of Albania, in connection with widespread looting incidents that led to chaos in Albania
in 1997 and affected the performance of the foreign investor, the Tribunal adopted an approach
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territories by the GNC to extremist militias who refuse what they see as
foreign imperialism in holy Muslim territories, even if that was at the
expense of an economic collapse, is certainly a factor the GNC would
have to grapple with in order to abide by its contractual and treaty
obligations. These circumstances should be regarded.

that stressed the importance of proportionality in due diligence where the host state's
circumstances and furthermore level of development and stability is a consideration in the practice
of Tribunals. See Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Eng'rs (Greece) v. Republic of Albania, Case
No. ARB/07/21 (ICSID 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaO61

8.pdf.
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